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Abstract 
Value-at-Risk (VaR), defined as the maximum expected loss for a certain 
portfolio at a target timeframe, given a certain confidence level, prevailed as the 
keystone indicator for market risk in the banking industry. Considering it is a 
generally accepted indicator among stakeholders, it is crucial to understand 
whether it provides an adequate level of informativeness.  
Since the late nineties, it started being integrated in the quarterly and annual 
reports of banks, being nowadays a mandatory regulatory disclosure. This 
stated, the relationship between the trading VaR and the subsequent variation in 
trading revenues of a sample of large banks was investigated. 
The results suggest that VaR has predictive power over succeeding volatility 
in trading revenues, presenting satisfactory informativeness for stakeholders. 
This confirms the investigation with no precedent performed by Jorion (2002), 
which served as starting point for the current investigation. Moreover, the VaR 
predictive power increased since the previous study, which provides evidence 
that the industry accommodated the many empirical evolutions reached in the 
VaR calculation domain over the past years. 
 
 
Keywords: Value-at-Risk, informativeness, empirical evolution, market risk, 
reporting, Basel Committee 
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Resumo 
O Value-at-Risk (VaR), definido como a perda máxima esperada para um certo 
portefólio, para um determinado espectro temporal e nível de confiança, 
prevaleceu enquanto pilar para a mensuração de risco de mercado no setor 
financeiro. Tendo em conta que se trata de um indicador globalmente aceite entre 
as partes interessadas, é fulcral entender a adequação da sua capacidade 
informativa. 
Desde o final dos anos 90, o VaR passou a ser integrado nos reportes 
trimestrais e anuais publicados pelos bancos, sendo atualmente matéria de 
divulgação regulatória obrigatória. Neste sentido, foi investigada a relação entre 
o VaR da carteira de negociação dos bancos e as variações subsequentes ao nível 
da receita proveniente da negociação.  
Os resultados sugerem que o VaR tem capacidade explicativa sob a 
volatilidade posteriormente experienciada nas receitas de negociação, 
apresentando uma capacidade informativa satisfatória para as partes 
interessadas. 
Tal confirma a investigação sem precedentes de Jorion (2002), que serviu de 
base à corrente investigação. Acrescente-se ainda que se registou um aumento da 
capacidade explicativa do VaR desde o estudo anterior, emergindo evidências de 
que o setor acomodou as inúmeras evoluções empíricas que se foram registando 
ao nível do cálculo do VaR. 
 
 
Palavras-chave: Value-at-Risk, capacidade informativa, evolução empírica, 
risco de mercado, reporte, Basel Committee 
 
 viii 
 
Table of Contents 
Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................ iv 
Agradecimentos ............................................................................................................. v 
Abstract .......................................................................................................................... vi 
Resumo .......................................................................................................................... vii 
Table of Contents ........................................................................................................ viii 
List of Figures ................................................................................................................ ix 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................... x 
List of Abbreviations .................................................................................................... xi 
Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1 
Foundations of VaR ....................................................................................................... 3 
1.1. Defining Market Risk ......................................................................................... 3 
1.2. The Roots of VaR ................................................................................................. 4 
1.3. Regulatory Implementations ............................................................................. 5 
Concept and Evolution of Empirical Approaches .................................................... 8 
2.1. Existing Approaches ........................................................................................... 9 
2.1.1. Nonparametric Approaches ...................................................................... 9 
2.1.2. Monte Carlo Simulation .......................................................................... 11 
2.1.3. Parametric Approaches ........................................................................... 11 
2.1.4. Semiparametric Approaches ................................................................... 14 
2.2. Comparing the Models ..................................................................................... 15 
Backtesting VaR Calculations .................................................................................... 19 
3.1. The Concept ....................................................................................................... 19 
3.2. Regulatory Approach ....................................................................................... 20 
3.3. Academic Approaches ..................................................................................... 22 
Criticisms and Alternatives to VaR ........................................................................... 24 
Testing VaR Disclosures Informativeness ................................................................ 27 
5.1. Past Studies ........................................................................................................ 27 
5.2. Methodology ...................................................................................................... 28 
5.3. Data and Descriptive Statistics ........................................................................ 31 
5.3.1. Trading Revenues ..................................................................................... 33 
5.3.2. Value-at-Risk ............................................................................................. 36 
5.4. Results ................................................................................................................. 38 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 47 
References ..................................................................................................................... 49 
 ix 
List of Figures 
Figure 1 - Evolution of the Sample Banks’ Trading Revenues over the Period 
(2000-18) in million euros. .......................................................................................... 35 
Figure 2 - Quarterly VaR-Based Volatility in Absolute Unexpected Trading 
Revenues ....................................................................................................................... 41 
Figure 3 - Yearly VaR-Based Volatility in Absolute Unexpected Trading 
Revenues ....................................................................................................................... 44 
 x 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1 - Basel III Backtesting Zones ................................................................... 21 
Table 2 - Sample Banks Country and Market Share ......................................... 32 
Table 3  - Sample Banks Total versus Trading Revenue (period average) .... 34 
Table 4 - Sample Banks' Quarterly VaR-Based Volatility and Unexpected 
Trading Revenues from 2000 to 2018 (average and standard deviation) ............ 35 
Table 5 - Sample Banks' Annual VaR-Based Volatility and Unexpected 
Trading Revenues from 2000 to 2018 (average and standard deviation) ............ 36 
Table 6 - Description of the Banks' Reported VaR ............................................ 37 
Table 7 - Bank Specific Regressions of Quarterly Absolute Unexpected 
Trading Revenues on VaR-Based Volatility ............................................................ 39 
Table 8 - Pooled Regressions of Quarterly Absolute Unexpected Trading 
Revenues on VaR-Based Volatility ............................................................................ 40 
Table 9 - Pooled Regressions of Quarterly Absolute Unexpected Trading 
Revenues on VaR-Based Volatility - Fixed Effects .................................................. 41 
Table 10 - Bank Specific Regressions of Yearly Absolute Unexpected Trading 
Revenues on VaR-Based Volatility ............................................................................ 43 
Table 11 - Pooled Regressions of Yearly Absolute Unexpected Trading 
Revenues on VaR-Based Volatility ............................................................................ 44 
Table 12 - Pooled Regressions of Yearly Absolute Unexpected Trading 
Revenues on VaR-Based Volatility - Fixed Effects .................................................. 45 
  
 xi 
List of Abbreviations  
 
ARCH: Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity models 
BCBS: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
BIS: Bank of International Settlements 
CAViaR: Conditional Autoregressive Quantile Specification 
ECB: European Central Bank 
ES: Expected Shortfall 
EVT: Extreme Value Theory 
FASB: Financial Accounting Standards Board 
FE: Fixed Effects 
GARCH: Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity models 
IASB: International Accounting Standards Board 
IRB: Internal Rating-Based 
i.i.d.: independent and identically distributed 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares 
US: United States of America 
VaR: Value-at-Risk 
 
  
 1 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The financial disasters experienced in the early nineties, followed by the 
subprime crisis in 2008, with systemic effects in the banking industry, flagged the 
imminent urge for the implementation of steady risk management tools and 
controls.  
This stated, during the past years, there was a concerted effort on the banking, 
academic and particularly regulatory spheres towards implementing robust risk 
management mechanisms. 
One of the main risk sources that affect the banking activity is market risk, 
associated with the impact of fluctuations in the financial markets in the banking 
book value (see Basel Committee, 1996). Value-at-Risk, introduced by 
Guldimann (1980s) and defined as the maximum expected loss for a certain 
portfolio at a target timeframe, given a certain confidence level, prevailed as the 
keystone indicator for market risk, being nowadays a mandatory regulatory 
disclosure imposed by the Basel Committee for the purpose of capital 
requirements calculation. 
Its conceptual simplicity, aggregating in a single number the market risk of a 
portfolio, is in the genesis of its popularity. 
However, if not properly computed, it might lead to hazardous 
misspecifications of the level of risk carried by an institution. An extensive effort 
has been performed through the past years to cover the flaws of the existing 
calculation methodologies and bring new ones into discussion (from 
RiskMetrics, 1996 parametric approach to Bali, 2007 extreme value theory 
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approach). Moreover, ex-post assessment techniques, also known as backtesting, 
have been developed and even alternative measures have been considered (see 
Laurent, 2016 and Basel Committee, 2019).  
Increasing VaR accuracy is an ongoing challenge and the current work serves 
exactly the purpose of understanding the evolution in terms of VaR accuracy 
during the past few years, through the successive assimilation of academic 
methodologies. 
This dissertation investigates the explanatory power of the publicly disclosed 
VaR by some of the largest banks worldwide in the volatility of the subsequently 
reported trading revenues. It departs from the study developed by Jorion (2002) 
and updates it with some methodological variations. 
The aim is to understand if, throughout the years, the financial sector absorbed 
the academic evolutions in the VaR calculation domain and if those evolutions 
reflected in an increase of informativeness for stakeholders, particularly analysts 
and investors. 
It is fundamental for stakeholders to have access to an accurate market risk 
assessment, providing them with a continuous awareness of their own portfolio 
volatility profile and understand whether financial institutions are maximizing 
the efficiency of regulatory reporting and, consequently, maximizing the 
efficiency of capital allocation. 
Chapter 1 provides a journey across the roots of VaR. Chapter 2 explores the 
VaR concept, the existing empirical approaches and how they compare with each 
other. Chapter 3 focuses on the backtesting concept and available techniques. 
Chapter 4 develops on the criticisms and alternatives to VaR. Chapter 5 is the 
core chapter, presenting the studies that preceded the current one, the 
methodology, the data and descriptive statistics and finally the results. The 
conclusion dedicates to summarizing the main topics approached, the 
contributions and limitations of the study. 
 3 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
Foundations of VaR 
1.1. Defining Market Risk 
Among financial institutions, one of the core concerns is the risk carried in 
their own portfolios, the so-called market risk, which refers to changes in an 
investment value due to factors that generally affect financial markets.  
There are four main sub risks that fit this category: the interest rate risk, 
associated with the impact of unexpected interest rate changes in the value of 
fixed income financial instruments; exchange rate risk, which refers to changes 
in the value of investments related to changes in the relative value of two 
currencies; equity risk, due to price changes in stocks; and commodity risk, 
associated with changes in the prices of commodities (see Basel Committee, 
1996).  
It is important to stress that, although risk is commonly linked with the 
probability of experiencing unexpected losses, it shall be viewed as the 
probability of unexpected outcomes, both positive and negative (Jorion, 2006). 
There are several past examples of significant losses associated with the 
neglection of extraordinary traders’ performance, which should but have not 
raised a red flag in the respective institutions’ risk management.  
Market risk management and assessment plays a central role among banks, 
providing them a continuous awareness of their profit and losses volatility 
profile, and allowing them to align this profile with the institutional risk appetite 
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policies. A rigorous and thoughtful assessment is also fundamental to maximize 
the efficiency of regulatory reporting and, consequently, maximize the efficiency 
of capital allocation (see Jorion, 2006). 
1.2. The Roots of VaR 
For several years, the commonly used measure to quantify portfolio risk was 
the standard deviation. However, the financial disasters during the early 1990’s 
flagged an imminent urge to develop more accurate risk measures. 
Exemplifying, the longstanding UK bank Barings PLC bankrupted due to 
losses of a single trader in derivatives. A similar situation happened with the 
Japanese 12th largest bank, Daiwa, but they had sufficient robustness to 
withstand. There is also the local government fund Orange Country incident, in 
the US, overexposed to reverse repos and simultaneously poorly reporting 
positions at cost instead of market value. 
Cases like these led to billions of dollars insolvency costs and losses for both 
institutions and investors during the early nineties, which could have probably 
been avoided if portfolio VaR was publicly available, creating early awareness 
among investors. 
Responses to the clear insufficiency of risk management policies enforcements 
started to be subject of debate in the private sector sphere. Value-at-Risk (VaR) 
models emerged in that context and have prevailed until nowadays as a keystone 
of market risk management in the financial sector.  
Till Guldimann, the head of global research at J.P. Morgan in the late 1980’s, is 
recognized as the father of the concept. At the time, the corporate risk 
management had to figure whether a full hedge was reached through investing 
in long maturity bonds, keeping earnings stable but market values volatile, or 
investing in cash, keeping the market value constant.  
  5 
The conclusion was that risks associated with value volatility prevailed over 
risks associated with earnings, laying the foundations for the VaR concept, which 
was then documented for the first time in the G-301 report, published in 1993. 
J.P. Morgan’s early efforts became a material risk management tool with the 
issuance of RiskMetrics, which was the foundation to the following research on 
the risk management domain and implementations among financial institutions. 
1.3. Regulatory Implementations 
The transposition to the regulatory sphere happened under the January 1996 
Amendment to the Capital Accord to incorporate market risk. Arising from the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision intention to refine their framework 
towards the incorporation of banks' exposures to the different classes of 
securities, it allowed banks to base their regulatory capital requirements for 
market risk on internal VaR calculations. Naturally, they were subject to 
qualitative and quantitative standards (see BCBS, 1996). A simultaneous 
implementation, under the FASB (Financial Accounting Standards Board) and 
then IASB (International Accounting Standards Board), was the recognition of 
derivatives as on-balance-sheet items, with a similar treatment to any other 
financial instrument, imposing a mark-to-market valuation. 
It was the Basel II Accord, in 2004, that settled the incorporation of market risk 
in the regulatory framework. It is anchored in three pillars: minimum regulatory 
risk-based capital requirements, setting charges for credit, market and 
operational risk; supervisory review, enhancing the role of the regulator in 
assuring that financial institutions operate below the minimum capital ratios; 
market discipline, implementing a new disclosure calendar and publishing 
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requisites to increase reporting discipline and, consequently, stakeholder 
awareness. 
The capital requirements for market risk can be calculated through the 
standardized approach, called the building block approach, which suggests the 
computation of market risk for portfolios exposed to interest rate risk, exchange 
rate risk, equity risk and commodity risk, which are then summed to get the full 
market risk. The main downside of this approach is ignoring diversification 
across risk categories, causing an over conservative capital charge. 
On the other hand, there is the internal rating-based approach, in which banks 
are allowed to use own models, as the regulator recognized that banks have 
developed much more sophisticated methodologies internally. Naturally, they 
have to satisfy qualitative and quantitative standards. 
Independently of the chosen method, the VaR shall follow these assumptions: 
10 trading days horizon, 99% confidence level, historical observation period of 1 
year or more (see BIS, 2004). 
Later, in response to the 2007 to 2009 great financial crisis, catalyzed essentially 
by excessive leverage and insufficient liquidity buffers across the banking 
industry, combined with poor risk management and incentive schemes, a 
package of additional principles and documentation was released to strengthen 
Basel II regulatory framework. 
 It was only in 2010 that Basel III standards were released, paving the path for 
a complete restructuring on the regulatory framework, by starting with 
incorporating higher capital standards and formulating improved liquidity risk 
measurement standards. This reform is a phased in process, working in the 
strengthening of each of the Basel pillars, which is expected to be complete by 
the end of 2019 (see BIS, 2004). 
In what concerns the standards for market risk minimum capital 
requirements, the revision was launched in 2016 and is expected to be fully 
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implemented by the end of 2019. Its core contributions are a product of the flaws 
identified in the great financial crisis. It contemplates a revision of the trading 
book and banking book concept, a revision of both the standardized and the 
internal models’ approach, a shift from value-at-risk (VaR) to expected shortfall 
(ES) and an introduction of market risk associated with illiquidity. 
Focusing on the shift from VaR, as defined in Basel II, to ES, it basically means 
going from a VaR estimation of maximum expected loss to a Conditional VaR 
estimation of expected losses beyond the VaR threshold. This stated, ES is a 
derivation of VaR, it follows the same assumptions but takes a further step by 
producing a measure of the scale of losses beyond VaR. The intention is to 
produce a more prudent measure, allowing for a sturdier tail risk assimilation 
and capital adequacy to react to stress periods. 
There is strong academic debate on the merits of these two, as explored by 
Laurent (2016). On the one hand, the ES approach is sub additive, allowing for 
positive externalities from diversification, however, it is claimed to be strongly 
dependent on scarce extreme events, triggering lack of robustness issues. 
The committee attenuates the potential over optimism of the above 
diversification effect by implementing limits. 
In terms of the calculation criterion for ES, a Gaussian distribution is assumed 
in the standardized approach, a confidence level of 97.5% and a time horizon 
dependent on the liquidity horizon, by risk factor and not by financial product 
type, to mitigate the risk of an unexpected loss of liquidity across asset markets 
(see BIS, 2019). 
Naturally, the consistency of this new implementation is a long way from 
being certain, both from an intellectual and practical point of view, as Laurent 
(2016) claims and further develops. 
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Chapter 2 
Concept and Evolution of Empirical Approaches 
Even though VaR’s elementary purpose was risk assessment, and, 
consequentially, capital requirement definition, providing protection against 
catastrophic market events in an increasingly globalized financial system, it is 
also broadly used as a management tool. For example, when the management 
decides on the traders’ capital allocation and trading limits and even at a later 
stage, as a guide to portfolio choice (for example, an increasing VaR might trigger 
the closing of a position). It is even becoming increasingly relevant in a non-
financial environment, applied to variables other than securities returns. 
Conceptually, VaR is a statistical measure of maximum expected loss for a 
certain portfolio, at a target timeframe, given a certain confidence level.   
Its conceptual simplicity, aggregating in a single number the market risk of a 
portfolio, is in the genesis of its popularity.  
Furthermore, it appears as a coherent risk measure, by satisfying the following 
desirable properties proposed by Artzner et al. (1999) for capital adequacy 
matters:  
 Monotonicity: if portfolio X1 has consistently lower returns than 
portfolio X2, then X1 has higher risk than X2. 
X1 ≤ X2, then ρ(X1) ≥ ρ(X2) 
 Subadditivity: a portfolio’s risk cannot be higher than the sum of the 
individual securities or smaller portfolios risks. 
  9 
ρ(X1 + X2) ≤ ρ(X1) + ρ(X2) 
 Translation invariance: adding k cash to a portfolio shall reduce its risk 
by k. 
ρ(X + k) = ρ(X) – k 
 Homogeneity: increasing the size of a portfolio by α, increases the risk 
proportionally. 
ρ(αX) = αρ(X) 
VaR estimation methodologies fit in three main categories of approaches, 
Nonparametric, Parametric and Semiparametric, as defined by Manganelli and 
Engle (2001). The Monte Carlo simulation method is often fitted in the parametric 
category but, considering its peculiarities, may be considered as a fourth 
category. 
2.1. Existing Approaches 
The choice of the stochastic process for prices is fundamental because if it is 
not realistic, the estimate of VaR will not be representative of the actual potential 
losses. Several approaches have been presented throughout time. 
2.1.1. Nonparametric Approaches 
The most general methodology to calculate VaR is the so-called nonparametric 
VaR. It is free from any assumption on the shape of returns’ distribution, using 
the past returns to predict future returns. The Historical Simulation approach 
falls under this category, focusing on the collection of returns on a time frame of 
observation (usually between one and three years), organizing them in ascending 
order to be able to determine the desired left quantile of returns (according to the 
defined confidence level) and directly obtain the VaR number. 
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By making no assumption at all regarding returns’ distribution, it is making a 
strong implicit assumption that the distribution of portfolio returns is i.i.d. and 
does not change within the timeframe, generating some inconsistencies (see ECB, 
2001). 
One of them relates to the choice of the time frame, which shall have enough 
length to allow a statistically significant inference but simultaneously shall 
capture only the current volatility cluster, which is by itself hard to identify. 
Moreover, if the VaR reports to a moment when the market is changing from 
low-to-high or high-to-low volatility periods, the estimate will be biased until 
time enough has passed so that the previous volatility frame leaves the 
observations window. 
But probably the most determinant inconsistency is the existence of 
groundless estimation jumps associated with the discreteness of extreme returns. 
This means that following a day with a large return, the estimate of VaR will 
jump in the opposite direction and a reversed effect will happen when the large 
return observation drops out of the observation time frame (for example, one 
year later if we consider a 1-year historical VaR). 
To alleviate these identified issues, a hybrid approach was presented by 
Boudoukh, Richardson and Whitelaw (1998), which attributes exponentially 
decreasing weights to past returns within the selected time frame, attributing 
more weight to recent returns than to older ones, allowing for a quicker response 
to changes in the market panorama. 
These nonparametric or quasi nonparametric methods present a simplistic, 
free from aprioristic assumptions on distributional shape, and easy to calculate 
approach comparing to parametric methods. However, there is some 
compromising in terms of results accuracy that shall be duly weighted. 
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2.1.2. Monte Carlo Simulation 
The Monte Carlo methodology, first formulated by Stanislaw Ulam in the 
atomic science context, and then furtherly explored by Nicholas Metropolis and 
John Neumann, in the 1940s, was latter applied to the financial risk management 
domain as an alternative to the above. Its essence stems from repetitively 
simulating a random process for the variable under scrutiny, enough to present 
an extensive series of possible outcomes. 
However, this method is not detached from distributional assumptions, since 
one must define the underlying standard joint distribution and specify a mean 
vector and a covariance matrix. 
It has a vast potential and flexibility, allowing for the incorporation of various 
risk sources and complex interactions, as well as the inclusion of non-linear 
exposures and complex pricing profiles (for example, options) or even more 
complex models to characterize expected returns.  
Yet, computing such specifications and complexity requires time and 
expensive investments in intellectual and systems development. If one does not 
want to compromise in accuracy, the number of simulations might easily reach 
astronomical figures, which is why the research towards new alternative 
methodologies is an ongoing concern, seeking for a more reasonable compromise 
between accuracy and complexity (see Jorion, 2006). 
2.1.3. Parametric Approaches 
Moving on to the category of parametric VaR approaches, here fit those 
models which imply the definition of a certain shape for returns. The earlier 
models assumed a standard normal distribution of returns, namely the JPMorgan 
RiskMetrics (1996) - which can be classified as an integrated GARCH2, inferring 
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variance through the exponential weighted moving average – and normal 
GARCH. 
When measuring market risk, capturing the financial data volatility is one of 
the key concerns. The ARCH 3  models, introduced in econometrics by Engle 
(1982), exhibited good adherence to financial data, as they are able to differentiate 
conditional and unconditional variance and allow conditional variance to change 
over time. Additionally, GARCH models, by introducing a moving average 
component, allow modelling both conditional changes in volatility over time and 
changes in time-dependent variance. 
However, because they rely on the assumption that standard residuals are 
i.i.d., implying normally distributed, this set of approaches tends to 
underestimate VaR. This because there is strong evidence that financial returns 
tend to deviate from that shape, by often presenting fat-tails and excess kurtosis 
(versus the symmetry and kurtosis of 3 of the normal distribution), which means 
that one might be underestimating the size of expected losses (topic addressed, 
for instance, by Hansen, 1994, Harvey and Siddique, 1999, Jondeau and 
Rockinger, 2003). 
This stated, in practice, VaR results under the normal distribution may be 
suitable in an environment of normal and stable market conditions but may fail 
in accommodating exceptionally volatile periods. 
Along with this potential misspecification source, it is also important to verify 
the empirical robustness of the variance specifications applied. The RiskMetrics 
Integrated GARCH model, for example, infers variance through the 
exponentially weighted moving average model, which accounts for the 
volatility-clustering phenomenon but fails to capture the asymmetry in stock 
market volatility and leverage effects (Pagan and Schwert, 1990). 
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These models have the great advantage of providing a complete 
characterization of returns’ distribution at a relatively low computational cost 
and there is room for improvement on its potential misspecifications by adjusting 
the distributional assumptions.  
Considering the identified drawbacks, many variations within the parametric 
models have emerged. Some of them are evolutions of the standard GARCH 
model, incorporating asymmetry and leverage effects. See, for instance, 
AGARCH 4  of Engle (1990), EGARCH 5  of Nelson (1991), GJR-GARCH 6  of 
Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle (1993), VGARCH7 and NAGARCH8 of Engle 
and Ng (1993), APGARCH9 of Ding, Granger and Engle (1993), TGARCH10 of 
Zakoïan (1994), QGARCH 11  of Sentana (1995), SQR-GARCH 12  of Heston and 
Nandi (2000). 
There are other variations in the domain of the stochastic volatility models, 
introduced by Taylor (1982, 1986). These models detach volatility from historical 
observations and attach it to an autoregressive stochastic process. While in the 
GARCH model the estimation of parameters can be calculated by maximum 
likelihood techniques, in stochastic volatility models alternative processes had to 
be conceived. 
Another variation proposed is the realized volatility method, concept 
introduced by Merton (1980), further explored by Taylor and Xu (1997) and latter 
corroborated by Andersen et al. (2001) and refined by other subsequent authors. 
The basic notion is that daily volatility can be easily inferred through the addition 
                                                 
4 Asymmetric GARCH model 
5 Exponential GARCH model 
6 Threshold GARCH model of Glosten 
7 Vector GARCH model 
8 Nonlinear Asymmetric GARCH model 
9 Asymmetric Power GARCH model 
10 Threshold GARCH 
11 Quadratic GARCH model 
12 Square-Root GARCH model 
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of the intra-daily square yields. One of the main consensuses to be reached in this 
model is the optimum basis frequency. 
With the aim of taking into account asymmetry and excess kurtosis of financial 
returns, it is also possible to identify academic efforts towards the 
implementation of the t-student distribution for VaR calculation, which reached 
a good acceptance in the industry, although academically the conclusions are 
ambiguous. Nonetheless, the classic t-student distribution has the main setback 
of not capturing financial returns skewness, which is why some modified 
versions arise, such as the Skewness t-Student Distribution (SSD) of Hansen 
(1994), Exponential Generalized Beta of the Second Kind (EGB2) of McDonald 
and Xu (1995), Skewness t-Generalised distribution (SGT) and Skewness Error 
Generalised Distribution (SGED) of Theodossiou (1998; 2001). 
2.1.4. Semiparametric Approaches 
In that context, alternative semiparametric models, which are an arrangement 
between the parametric and nonparametric approach, emerged and have been 
further explored in recent years. The ones being approached here, for the 
relevance to them attributed, are the CAViaR (Conditional Autoregressive 
Quantile Specification) and the EVT (Extreme Value Theory).  
The CAViaR proposes modeling the quantile directly instead of the whole 
distribution. It was introduced by Engle and Manganelli (2004) and departed 
from the above empirical statement that financial returns tend to present 
volatility clusters throughout time, which means that its distribution is 
autocorrelated. To formalize this specificity, an autoregressive specification was 
employed and the parameters were estimated by regression quantiles 
(introduced by Koenker and Bassett, 1978), which was considered more robust 
than OLS estimators when errors are fat-tailed. 
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Moving to the Extreme Value Theory, one of its latest advances was 
introduced by Bali (2007), who presents an unconditional and conditional 
extreme value approach to calculate VaR. The aim is to demonstrate that using 
the distribution of extreme financial returns provides a more accurate estimate 
of VaR than recalling the distribution of all returns, incorporating simultaneously 
a satisfactory prediction of cataclysmic market events.  
The author’s starting point was the unconditional extreme value approach 
developed by Longin (2000), McNeil and Frey (2000), and Bali (2003), 
incorporating the statistical theory of extremes and the corresponding tail 
estimation. However, the unconditional approach ignores the serial correlation 
and conditional heteroscedasticity of most financial data, so a conditional 
approach is proposed to account for systematic time-varying fluctuations in 
financial returns distribution. 
The results indicated that specifically the conditional Box-Cox GEV 13 
distribution reached an outstanding performance on capturing the extent and 
rate of occurrence of extreme market events, outperforming both the normal and 
skewed t distributions. 
2.2. Comparing the Models 
Although conceptually simple, if not properly estimated, VaR may lead to 
inaccurate definition of capital levels by financial institutions, which might turn 
excessively high or low, producing inefficiencies on risk coverage or capital 
allocation.  
From this issue, several authors committed to compare the existing 
approaches, to identify those which represent more appropriately the actual 
distribution of returns.  It is hard to find work documenting the comparative 
                                                 
13 Conditional Box-Cox transformation applied to the generalised distribution of extreme values 
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performance of a wide range of VaR methodologies, as the comprehensive 
review and summary table presented by Abad, Benito and López (2014) 
illustrates. Most of the identified papers focus on comparing the extreme value 
theory with either the nonparametric historical simulation or variations of the 
parametric approach. 
This derives from the fact that the EVT based methodologies keep proving to 
produce the best results alone and comparatively, so they are often seen as the 
benchmark for alternative approaches.  
Still, in earlier studies it is possible to find comparisons focusing on parametric 
and nonparametric approaches, considering the alternative methods were not as 
developed yet. Within the parametric family, the assessment of alternative 
approaches to VaR is elaborated by Bams, D., and Wielhouwer, J. L. (2000). The 
authors compared four methods. 
The unconditional method is the simplest of all and the one broadly applied 
among financial institutions. It assumes constant variance and expected value of 
returns over time. When using this method, the historical period used shall be 
short, otherwise, the obtained results are susceptible of being distant from the 
present situation. The second method, which considers time varying drift, 
applies an AR model, incorporating the existence of persistence in the levels of 
returns. 
Another method with time varying drift and volatility, being the error term 
normally distributed, by applying GARCH (1,1). Finally, one with time varying 
drift and volatility, also making use of GARCH (1,1) but being the error term t-
student distributed, to allow for a fatter left tail, meaning more probability of 
high losses. 
 Among the briefly described models, the one that proofed more accuracy for 
the purpose was the last one, as it combines a progressively higher weight 
attributed to more recent observations, which are more likely to influence the 
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near future and, simultaneously fat left tails, which is a more realistic view on 
securities, that have the tendency to show more frequently high losses than high 
positive returns.  However, this comes at the cost of having a larger standard 
error, meaning more uncertainty about the true value. 
The conclusions reached underline the importance of establishing an adequate 
probability distribution, including fat tails that better reflect the behavior of 
extreme returns. 
 Moreover, being the VaR based on historical information, more weight should 
be given to recent observations, which better reflect the current market 
conditions. There are two alternatives in doing so, introducing a time varying 
return distribution on a large sample of historical returns or use more recent 
observations only. The first option is preferable, once it allows for more robust 
estimates. 
It also became evident that the VaR should not be presented alone but 
preferably with the respective standard deviation, to provide insight on the 
underlying level of uncertainty. 
Succedingly, Kuester et al. (2006) performed a broader comparison between 
variations of the nonparametric, parametric approaches and EVT. The basis for 
comparison were historical daily returns of the NASDAQ Composite Index over 
30 years and the Christoffersen (1998) framework was applied to evaluate the 
out-of-sample forecast accuracy. The authors found that the heavy-tail GARCH 
under an EVT based approach demonstrated the best performance, followed by 
a filtered historical simulation. Once more, using distributions that account for 
fat-tails and skewness constitutes an improvement contrasted with the normal 
assumption, being the skewed t within the best performing models. 
It was also possible to conclude that none of the CAViaR models performed 
well, which is associated with the absence of a return process estimation along 
with the direct quantile modelling. So, the authors suggest a multistep-ahead 
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forecast that estimates a model for the overall return profile and a CAViaR model 
for the quantiles. 
Moving on to Ergun and Jun (2010) work, which focuses on GARCH and ETV 
methodologies comparison when applied to the S&P500 Index, a flag is raised 
about the potential of the GARCH models. Specifically, the ARCD model 
(Autoregressive Conditional Density) parametric approach, which allows for 
time-varying conditional high-order moments, exhibited the most accurate 
results, when compared to other GARCH models or the EVT approach, which 
still presented good results. 
Bali and Theodossiou (2008) and later Polanski and Stoja (2010) reinforce that 
the parametric method, allowing for asymmetric and leptokurtic distributions 
and in a mixed-distribution framework, provides accurate forecasting power, 
which strengthens the statements of the above paragraph. 
In summary, it is possible to conclude from most literature dedicated to VaR 
model comparison that EVT is the common denominator of most studies, and 
performs the best when estimating VaR, followed by the Filtered Historical 
Simulation. The parametric techniques, when anchored on fat-tailed and skewed 
distributions and coupled with time-varying conditional high-order moments, 
also present great potential of VaR estimation (see Abad, Benito and López, 
2014). 
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Chapter 3 
Backtesting VaR Calculations  
3.1. The Concept 
Backtesting constitutes an ex-post assessment on the performance of a 
certain model. Sound backtesting procedures add a layer of confidence in the 
conceived model by showing how well they behave when applied to real 
historical events.  
In the case of VaR backtesting, it is essential to choose a representative 
sample of historical data, covering a period long enough to capture potential 
variations on market conditions and events. It is important to avoid being biased 
when choosing the sample, because when formulating VaR measures, historical 
data is often used in the model’s calibration, so the risk management shall 
backtest under different data sets. 
 Backtesting procedures intend to capture if the number of exceptions, 
when comparing the daily VaR to the real daily gains or losses, exceeds the 
chosen confidence level. A higher number of exceptions means a less accurate 
VaR model, which is underestimating risk. On the other hand, if the number of 
exceptions is too low it might mean that the institution is inefficiently allocating 
capital for market risk purposes (see Escanciano and Olmo, 2010 and Jorion, 
2006). 
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Lastly, it is important to stress that backtesting is not the same as scenario 
analysis, as the second, instead of real historical data, relies on hypothetical data 
to simulate potential outcomes. 
3.2. Regulatory Approach 
As stated by Alan Greenspan (1996) and very suitably quoted by Jorion 
(2006) in the backtesting context, disclosure of quantitative measures of market risk, 
such as value-at-risk, is enlightening only when accompanied by a thorough discussion 
of how the risk measures were calculated and how they related to actual performance. 
  Particularly in a context in which VaR is the recognized cornerstone 
indicator of market risk and adding the fact that the Basel Committee allows 
financial institutions to report VaR under internal based approaches, it is 
fundamental to have mechanisms to validate VaR models accuracy. 
 The Committee’s backtesting framework (see BIS, 2019) requires 
institutions implementing the internal based approach to compare their daily 
VaR number with the subsequent daily trading gains or losses.  To extract the 
banks’ VaR model performance, one shall count the number of times that VaR 
surpasses the following trading revenue in absolute terms (number of 
exceptions). The obtained coverage ratio is then compared to the goal coverage 
of the model to obtain its performance measure. 
 Materializing, for the 97.5th and 99th percentile, with at least the most recent 
full year of observations equally weighted, if the number of exceptions exceeds 
30 or 12, respectively, the institution shall migrate back to the standardized 
approach. The institution shall stick to the standardized approach until it is able 
to demonstrate to be below the exceptions’ thresholds over at least the previous 
full year. 
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But the Committee does not rely solely on this backtesting measure. In order 
to increase the backtesting informativeness, it defines alert levels below this 
threshold based on the number of exceptions and the corresponding probability 
of model inaccuracy.  
Table 1 shows an example for 250 observations (one trading year): 
Table 1 - Basel III Backtesting Zones 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the green zone, there are no reasons to concern about the model’s accuracy, 
with less than 4 exceptions. In the yellow zone, the number of exceptions is 
already a flag of a necessary increase in capital requirements for market risk by 
the multiplication factor. The logics behind the multiplier is being enough to 
restore the 99th percentile standard. Finally, in the red zone, it is assumed that 
there is a problem inherent to the model and the regulator starts a deeper 
investigation on the circumstances and requests the institution for immediate 
efforts towards improving the model. 
The intention is to instigate the financial institutions’ risk management to have 
robust and ongoing monitoring procedures and create steady fundamentals for 
                                                 
14 The probability of obtaining a given or fewer exceptions in 250 observations when the true coverage level is 
99%. 
Zone Number of Exceptions Multiplier Cumulative Probability14 
Green 
0 1.50 8.11% 
1 1.50 28.58% 
2 1.50 54.32% 
3 1.50 75.81% 
4 1.50 89.22% 
Yellow 
5 1.70 95.88% 
6 1.76 98.63% 
7 1.83 99.60% 
8 1.88 99.89% 
9 1.92 99.97% 
Red ≥ 10 2.00 99.99% 
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their proposed models. This is the Committee’s first step in the direction of a 
robust verification system.  
3.3. Academic Approaches 
The effort to appropriately backtesting VaR models goes beyond the 
regulatory sphere. In the academic domain, different approaches were 
experimented. 
Firstly, the simplest approach is the unconditional coverage, which ignores 
that data is time varying. This is an important issue, as it is different to have a 
condensed cluster of backtesting exceptions or exceptions scattered over time. 
When clustered, they might not mean an actual model invalidity but some 
specific abnormal market event. 
The author of the broadly acknowledged unconditional coverage test himself, 
Kupiec (1995), recognizes the above weakness. 
To cover this issue, conditional coverage models emerged, starting from 
Christoffersen (1998) Markov test, which examines the independency of VaR 
models. It consists on daily setting a deviation indicator of 1 or 0, depending on 
VaR being exceeded or not, respectively. This indicator, when treated under the 
appropriate formulated test statistics, allow us to understand whether exceptions 
are clustered or not. He later added to this formulation that if exceptions are 
independent from each other, the time frame between them shall be independent 
from the time since the last exception occurred, meaning exceptions to VaR shall 
not present duration dependence.  
In parallel, some authors suggested the evaluation of the full distribution 
instead of focusing solely on a certain percentile (see Crnkovi and Drachman, 
1997 and Berkowitz, 2001), however this method demands a large historical 
interval of data to produce significant results. 
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There is also the class of loss function based backtesting, introduced by Lopez 
(1999), which goes further than a hit function of violating or not the estimated 
VaR and captures the magnitude of the exceedance. In this case, the accuracy of 
the VaR models is determined taking into account the average losses on 
exceedances instead of solely the number of violations. 
Following the intention of moving from binary variables to more in-depth 
backtesting methods, there is also the quantile regression method, treating VaR 
as the regressor, based on Koenker and Xiao (2002) quantile regression model, 
and further developed by Gaglianone et al. (2011). This methodology allows the 
identification of when and why a misspecification occurred. 
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Chapter 4 
Criticisms and Alternatives to VaR 
With the methodological evolution over time, as presented in Chapter 2, much 
of the identified VaR flaws were progressively accommodated. 
However, there are some remaining VaR drawbacks that are inherent to its 
concept and context, and not as much related to the technicalities under its 
calculation.  
Context wise, it is argued that the increasing complexity under VaR modeling 
favors larger financial institutions, considering they have larger risk 
management structures and resources comparing to smaller ones or even to the 
regulatory bodies (see, for instance, Mariathasan and Merrouche, 2014 and 
Begley, Purnanandam and Zheng, 2016). The possibility of internal rating-based 
reporting allows them for great discretion that might lead to unidentified 
underreporting, compromising the fairness and adequateness of capital 
allocation. Backtesting methodologies are used by the regulatory authorities to 
prevent this hazardous behavior from happening. However, considering 
backtesting is based on historical asset prices, there is the possibility of going 
undetected or of delayed detection. It is arguable if the flaw is on VaR and its 
inherent calculation complexity or on the backtesting techniques, but the ongoing 
concern with techniques accuracy and good practices tends to progressively 
mitigate this issue both on the regulatory and institutional spheres. 
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Moving to the conceptual setbacks, one of the main concerns relates to the fact 
that VaR smooths volatility estimates and, consequently, appears as a fragile 
indicator during severe crisis periods, as the 2008 crisis confirmed (as shown by 
Haldane and Madouros, 2012, for example). 
This is in the basis for the shift from VaR to ES, proposed in the Basel III 
framework, as the latest allows the quantification of the scale of losses beyond 
VaR. Yet, this alternative has not reached unanimous support, as it is strongly 
dependent on scarce extreme events, triggering lack of robustness issues. 
Furthermore, being a sub-additive measure that innately accounts for 
diversification benefits, might lead to an over optimistic incorporation of 
diversification effects. Laurent (2016), provides a clear summary of the benefits 
and setbacks of this alternative and leaves a question mark on the tradeoff that 
can be obtained from the migration, under a financial stability perspective. 
Nevertheless, neither VaR not its most popular alternative, ES, are as 
straightforward or as transparent as they conceptually appear. As stated by 
Laurent (2016), the IRB approaches are complex and limitless, which combined 
with the specificities in the nature of each bank’s portfolios, makes model 
auditing and comparisons between institutions difficult. 
It is arguable if this is a problem of the models themselves or an issue at the 
regulatory framework level, often criticized, namely by Danielsson et al. (2015), 
for making it difficult to implement reliable macroprudential policies. 
Probably there are sufficient arguments to consider a market risk assessment 
less reliant on VaR, incorporating complementary measures, such as ES (to 
account for the scale of losses beyond VaR), diversification effects metrics, and 
asset classification, weighting them in a single equation. Furthermore, weighting 
the benefits of allowing for IRB approaches instead of a single, generally accepted 
in the academic field methodology, is also an important topic to put under 
discussion.  
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In summary, it is doubtless that VaR is a keystone on market risk 
measurement, what is under scrutiny in most literature is its legitimacy without 
the support of complementary measures, its regulatory framework and the 
accuracy of each alternative methodology for its calculation.  
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Chapter 5 
Testing VaR Disclosures Informativeness 
5.1. Past Studies 
Understanding the effectiveness of VaR calculations in predicting the 
unexpected future potential maximum losses is fundamental to conclude about 
its pertinence as the key market risk measure among financial institutions.  
To do so, in an assessment with no precedent, Philippe Jorion (2002) in How 
Informative Are Value-at-Risk Disclosures? centers on the relationship between VaR 
disclosures in financial institutions reports and the subsequent behavior of their 
trading returns.  
Berkowitz and O’Brien (2001) published a paper addressing the daily VaR 
privately reported by Banks and the subsequent trading returns. However, this 
study acts at the estimation accuracy level but not at the level of informativeness 
of publicly disclosed VaR estimates to the overall stakeholders. This because 
daily VaR numbers are private information, exclusive to the regulators and not 
available to the remaining stakeholders. Naturally, the informativeness of daily 
VaR on subsequent trading revenues is expected to be satisfactory, but the same 
might not hold in quarterly or annual frequencies. 
To perform the investigation, Philippe Jorion (2002) used a sample of eight US 
banks, considering at the time the study was performed it was not possible to 
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find more banks with at least five years of publicly disclosed VaR, on quarterly 
or annual reports.  
The results showed a very significant relationship between VaR forecasts 
published by banks and the future experienced market risk, particularly when 
using cross-section analysis but also over time. This means that banks which 
reported low VaR had a narrower downside risk and those with higher VaR 
experienced larger fluctuations.  
Considering the obtained conclusions, VaR reports appeared to be meaningful 
flags for information stakeholders, as it is the case of analysists and investors, in 
the evaluation of risk/ return adequacy. 
Apart from the usefulness of VaR reporting as a relevant information source 
for stakeholders, it is also a mechanism to impose discipline inside the 
institutions towards constant monitoring and risk management. 
Nonetheless, there was still plenty of room to accuracy improvement, even 
within this sample of well-established financial institutions. At the time of the 
publishing, the author claimed there shall be a natural evolution as new and 
more consistent methodologies arise. 
More than 15 years later, that is what the current work intends to infer, with 
considerably more data available and a sufficiently large time frame behind to 
allow the financial industry to incorporate the methodologies that have proven 
more accuracy. 
 
5.2. Methodology 
VaR can be defined as the maximum expected losses, being the probability of 
an institution incurring losses beyond that level 1 minus the confidence level 
defined (for instance, for the commonly used confidence level of 99%, the 
probability of incurring losses beyond the VaR level would be 1%). 
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Interpreting the above, the probability of the absolute unexpected trading 
revenue of the following period ( 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑡+1 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑡+1))  being lower than the 
reported VaR on the current period (𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡) shall be 1 minus the confidence level 
(𝑐𝑙): 
𝑃[|𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑡+1 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑡+1)| < 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡] = 1 − 𝑐𝑙 
 
However, we are not able to perform this daily computation, because daily 
VaR and trading revenues data is proprietary information a stakeholder cannot 
access. 
This stated, and as an alternative, as suggested by Jorion (2002), VaR will be 
transformed into a dispersion measure, as tests based on dispersion are more 
powerful than those based on the number of exceptions (analogously to what 
happens in backtesting, as described in 3.2.). To do so, it was assumed that 
trading revenues (𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑡+1) are symmetrically distributed while accommodating 
fat tails, which, as previously referred, is a characteristic of financial returns. 
Translating the above, trading revenues are assumed to have a conditional 
normal distribution with mean zero and variance 𝑠𝑡
2. 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑡+1~𝑁(0; 𝑠𝑡
2), 
being 𝑠𝑡
2 =  𝜔𝑡′ ∑ 𝜔𝑡𝑡 , which represents the effect of fixed positions multiplied 
by the covariance matrix of market risk factors at day t closing. 
 
This approach becomes distorted when the underlying distribution is much 
skewed, but this shall not be a concern, considering the current sample only 
includes large banks, which typically carry on their own portfolios a large range 
of instruments, exposed to the most diverse risk factors. 
Incorporating these assumptions, means that 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡  will be the forecasted 
volatility times the standard normal deviate assumed, associated to the 
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confidence level underlying VaR calculation (the most common is a 99% 
confidence level, meaning a standard normal deviate of z = 2.33): 
 
𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡 = 𝑧𝑠𝑡 
 
The last step to transform VaR in a volatility measure is performing the square 
root of time adjustment15. Then, the estimated volatility adjusted to the period 
(quarter or year) will be: 
 
𝜎𝑡 = 𝑠𝑡√𝑇, being 𝑠𝑡 =
𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝑧
 
 
Applying a 99% confidence level and quarterly VaR and trading revenues 
reporting, the estimated volatility of trading revenues at time t is: 
 
𝜎𝑡 =
𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
2,33
√63 
 
The above implies that one assumes 𝜎𝑡  is measured without error. 
Extrapolating VaR to quarterly or yearly horizons might be a source of error, by 
assuming the variance in trading revenues is constant over time. By examining 
the daily VaR graphics disclosed by some of the large banks, this assumption 
appears reasonable, as there is some variation within the quarterly and yearly 
frames, but major variations occur in longer horizons. 
Additionally, it is necessary to create a measure of unexpected trading 
revenues. This because, there is an expected component in trading revenues 
related to fees and interest income, which is out of the scope of VaR calculations. 
                                                 
15 In circumstances with i.i.d. returns, variances are additive throughout time, meaning volatility grows with the 
square root of time. For this purpose, time is measured in trading days (252 in a year, 92 in a quarter). 
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To do so, and once more in line with the suggested by Jorion (2002), the 
moving average of trading revenues over the past four quarters or the past year, 
depending on the availability, is subtracted to the quarterly or annual trading 
revenue under computation. The unexpected trading revenue can then be 
defined as follows: 
 
For quarterly reported values: 
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑡+1 − 𝐸[𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑡+1] = 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑡+1 −
∑ 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑡+1−𝑖
4
𝑖=1
4
 
For yearly reported values: 
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑡+1 − 𝐸[𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑡+1] = 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑡 
 
Summarizing the above specifications, the final regression under scrutiny will 
be: 
|𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑡+1 − 𝐸[𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑡+1]| = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝜎𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡+1 
 
We are then testing if the volatility based on the average VaR reported at 
period t is informative about the unexpected trading revenues verified on the 
front period. The expectation is obtaining b>0 to confirm the relationship and a 
high R2, meaning VaR captures much of the unexpected trading revenues. 
5.3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The first criterion for sample choice was confining the study to large banks, 
which are jointly fairly representative of the financial sector. Furthermore, large 
banks tend to have sturdier risk management structures and, consequently, are 
usually pioneers in applying the most sophisticated methodologies and the latest 
academic findings. This stated, the following sample of sixteen of the largest 
banks worldwide was used: Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, Banco Santander 
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SA, Barclays PLC, BNP Paribas, Credit Agricole, Credit Suisse Group AG, HSBC 
Holdings PLC, Intesa Sanpaolo, Lloyds Banking Group PLC, Nordea Bank ABP, 
Royal Bank of Scotland Group, UniCredit SPA, Wells Fargo & Co, JPMorgan 
Chase & Co, Société Générale, Royal Bank of Canada. 
Table 2 shows that the sample is formed by large banks that jointly have a 
24.64% market share on the banking industry (measured in terms of total market 
cap), with individual market shares varying between 5.67% (JPMorgan) and 
0.31% (Société Générale). Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that there are 
banks from several counties, so the study is not constrained to United States 
banks, as it was the case on Jorion (2002) previous study. 
 
 
The collection of quarterly and annually reports was performed for the years 
between 2000 and 2018. It is difficult to find reports older than 2000 and the 
Table 2 - Sample Banks Country and Market Share 
Institution 
Market Cap 
(billion EUR) 
Country Market Share (%) 
JPMorgan Chase & Co 357.07 United States 5.67% 
Nordea Bank ABP 316.63 Finland 5.03% 
Wells Fargo & Co 212.43 United States 3.37% 
HSBC Holdings PLC 132.73 Britain 2.11% 
Royal Bank of Canada 101.75 Canada 1.62% 
Banco Santander SA 74.04 Spain 1.18% 
BNP Paribas 58.55 France 0.93% 
Lloyds Banking Group PLC 46.28 Britain 0.73% 
Intesa Sanpaolo 40.29 Italy 0.64% 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya 
Argentaria 
36.55 Spain 0.58% 
Credit Agricole 34.97 France 0.56% 
Credit Suisse Group AG 33.37 Switzerland 0.53% 
Royal Bank of Scotland Group 31.74 Britain 0.50% 
Barclays PLC 28.9 Britain 0.46% 
Unicredit SPA 27.88 Italy 0.44% 
Société Générale 19.27 France 0.31% 
Total 1 552.45 - 24.64% 
    
Banking Sector 6 300   
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information found in those is more incomplete. The 18-year time frame is 
adequate in terms of representativeness and is sufficiently large to observe the 
evolution on VaR disclosures informativeness throughout time. It was only 
possible to collect a satisfactory and continuous amount of quarterly data for 
seven of the banks on the sample. 
The financial indicators extracted from these reports were the following: 
Value-at-Risk, Trading Revenue, Total Revenue, Total Assets and Total Equity, 
being the last three solely for dimensionality purposes.  
As stated by Logan and Montgomery (1997) and corroborated by Jorion (2002) 
findings, it is difficult and quite far-fetched to take considerations on a bank’s 
market risk based on their position on derivatives, as it is not possible to 
distinguish hedging from speculation activities within this class of assets. This 
stated, the Notional Amount of Derivatives as a potential alternative proxy for 
market risk of the bank’s trading portfolio was not considered for the purpose of 
this study. 
The obtained numbers were all converted to euros at the respective period 
(quarter or year) average exchange rate. 
There are in total 405 observations, 221 of them constitute quarterly data and 
184 yearly data. The final data involves 16 banks, for 7 of which there is quarterly 
data available and for 15 there is annual data available. 
In terms of period coverage, the final data includes 70 quarters and 18 years 
between 2000 and 2018. 
5.3.1. Trading Revenues 
Depending on the availability, trading revenues were extracted from quarterly 
or annual reports, along with VaR disclosures. 
As it is possible to observe in table 3, the average trading revenues reported 
by financial institutions vary widely, from the minimum 397 million euros for 
  34 
Intesa Sanpaolo, to the maximum of 9 932 million euros for Lloyds Banking 
Group.  The proportion of trading revenues on total revenues is immaterial for 
some banks, around 1-3%, namely for Wells Fargo, BBVA, Intesa Sanpaolo, Royal 
Bank of Canada, UniCredit and Banco Santander. For the remaining banks, the 
trading revenues are more representative, between 4% and 34%, being the 
maximum registered for Lloyds (33.7%), followed by Société Générale (15%). 
Table 3  - Sample Banks Total versus Trading Revenue (period average) 
(in million euros) 
Trading Revenue Total Revenue 
Average Std. Dev. Average % Trading Rev. 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria 433.30 420.66 34 161.65 1.3% 
Banco Santander SA 2 200.41 1 380.70 71 454.20 3.1% 
Barclays PLC 4 549.69 2 545.13 30 845.33 14.7% 
BNP Paribas 5 086.90 1 008.85 65 829.00 7.7% 
Credit Agricole 2 950.00 2 764.29 39 260.00 7.5% 
Credit Suisse Group AG 2 304.30 3 165.42 53 511.46 4.3% 
HSBC Holdings PLC 6 910.60 2 493.65 91 811.54 7.5% 
Intesa Sanpaolo 396.62 409.14 25 739.00 1.5% 
JPMorgan Chase & Co 7 852.06 5 146.61 90 667.78 8.7% 
Lloyds Banking Group PLC 9 931.62 10 705.13 29 491.38 33.7% 
Nordea Bank ABP 1 466.54 313.99 15 433.77 9.5% 
Royal Bank of Canada 624.23 154.84 44 204.00 1.4% 
Royal Bank of Scotland Group 1 725.49 3 649.62 30 234.67 5.7% 
Société Générale 6 771.77 2 770.14 45 033.50 15.0% 
UniCredit SPA 630.45 1 034.39 39 244.71 1.6% 
Wells Fargo & Co 1 007.44 429.65 93 018.00 1.1% 
Focusing on the time evolution of trading revenues between 2000 and 2018, 
presented in figure 2, it is possible to observe that minimum levels were reached 
during the 2007-08 subprime financial crisis, the most severe since the Great 
Depression during the 1930s.  
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Figure 1 - Evolution of the Sample Banks’ Trading Revenues over the Period (2000-18) in million euros. 
Furthermore, high volatility is observable throughout the period, and 
confirmed through the significant standard deviations reported on the above 
table. This shall indicate that unexpected trading revenues will present 
expressive values. 
Table 4 and 5 show that, both yearly and quarterly, the unexpected trading 
revenues are substantially lower than absolute trading revenues but they are 
simultaneously different from zero, which allows to reject the hypothesis that the 
mean of unexpected trading revenues equals zero, consistently with the 
assumptions made in 5.2. 
Table 4 - Sample Banks' Quarterly VaR-Based Volatility and Unexpected Trading Revenues from 2000 to 2018 
(average and standard deviation) 
(in million euros) 
VaR Unexpected Trading Revenue 
Average 
Standard 
Deviation 
Average 
Standard 
Deviation 
Banco Santander SA 64 19 121 93 
Credit Suisse Group AG 164 69 662 635 
JPMorgan Chase & Co 319 208 1 208 1 331 
Nordea Bank ABP 202 90 96 79 
Royal Bank of Canada 114 73 82 71 
Royal Bank of Scotland Group 390 134 313 234 
Wells Fargo & Co 64 18 125 128 
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Table 5 - Sample Banks' Annual VaR-Based Volatility and Unexpected Trading Revenues from 2000 to 2018 
(average and standard deviation) 
(in million euros) 
VaR Unexpected Trading Revenue 
Average 
Standard 
Deviation 
Average 
Standard 
Deviation 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria 166 29 345 228 
Banco Santander SA 158 47 1 643 1 653 
Barclays PLC 311 126 1 893 1 802 
BNP Paribas 504 443 773 534 
Credit Agricole 138 140 3 172 2 049 
Credit Suisse Group AG 375 154 3 134 4 063 
HSBC Holdings PLC 371 320 2 646 1 507 
Intesa Sanpaolo 394 157 444 411 
JPMorgan Chase & Co 707 391 3 766 5 941 
Lloyds Banking Group PLC 64 81 12 874 9 137 
Nordea Bank ABP 477 227 265 225 
Royal Bank of Scotland Group 487 427 2 782 4 692 
Societe Generale 269 102 2 725 2 216 
Unicredit SPA 278 270 998 1 200 
Wells Fargo & Co 168 82 375 196 
5.3.2. Value-at-Risk 
Nowadays, as shown by the work of Perignon et al. (2007) and Perignon and 
Smith (2008), the industry standard is the one-day VaR, calculated through the 
historical simulation method and typically the extrapolation to the 10-day VaR, 
as imposed by the regulator, is calculated simply by scaling using the square root 
of 10. The review of banks’ reports performed for the purpose of this study 
allowed to confirm such pattern. 
Below, there is a summary descriptive table of the collected data (table 6), with 
the time interval of reports found for each institution, the method used for VaR 
calculation and its characteristics, meaning, historical time frame, confidence 
level and horizon. 
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Table 6 - Description of the Banks' Reported VaR 
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All banks, except for BNP Paribas, use historical simulation for VaR reporting 
purposes, mostly equally weighted (in which the same weight is attributed to all 
observations) and in fewer cases exponentially decreasing weights to past 
returns are used, attributing more weight to recent returns (namely, BBVA, 
Santander and Credit Suisse). The historical basis for calculation fluctuates 
between one and two years, the confidence level considered is mostly 99% and 
the horizon 1 day, assuming positions are fixed over a day horizon.  
Concerning the data availability, there is more abundancy of observations 
from 2006, particularly quarterly observations. For some banks it was only 
possible to find annual reports. 
For the purpose of the current work, average VaR was used, as it is more 
common to be found on banks reports and it also better captures the risk over the 
period. Using the end of the period VaR, would limit the risk perception to that 
single day. Furthermore, quarterly average VaR was privileged over yearly 
average VaR, so whenever quarterly VaR was available and it was possible to 
match it with a previous quarter trading revenue, it was used. 
The hierarchy of reporting frequency choice relates to the fact that annual VaR 
values are expected to deliver less accuracy as there is a larger time lag to the 
associated trading revenues. 
5.4. Results 
Primarily, the model is tested following the steps proposed by Jorion (2002), 
in order to check how the model with updated data (from 2001 to 2018) compares 
with the earlier model (data from 1994 to 2000). 
The formulated regression is first estimated individually for each bank. 
Among quarterly observations, seven time-series regressions were tested. Table 
7 shows the obtained results under a univariate OLS. It was not tested under the 
  39 
SUR method because this equation must be balanced, meaning that any 
information that is only available for some equations will be lost. In this case, 
much information would be wasted, so this test was excluded. 
It is possible to conclude that by applying this new data set, there appears to 
be some improvement in the results obtained. Credit Suisse and JPMorgan 
results seem to suggest a statistically significant positive relationship between 
the volatility measure derived from VaR and unexpected trading revenues. 
Furthermore, the coefficient of determination (R2) 16  for these two banks 
regressions is between 32% and 34%, indicating a good fit of the model. 
Table 7 - Bank Specific Regressions of Quarterly Absolute Unexpected Trading Revenues on VaR-Based Volatility 
|𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝐸[𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1]| = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝜎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 
Bank 
N. 
observations 
OLS 
Constant Slope 
R2 (t-statistic) 
Banco Santander SA 33 137.29 
(2.39) 
-0.25 
(-0.30) 
0.28% 
Credit Suisse Group AG 46 -187.12 
(-0.91) 
5.18*** 
(4.49) 
31.46% 
JPMorgan Chase & Co 67 18.50 
(0.08) 
3.73*** 
(5.78) 
33.97% 
Nordea Bank ABP 31 107.03 
(2.98) 
-0.05 
(-0.33) 
0.37% 
Royal Bank of Canada 9 -13.30 
(-0.17) 
0.92 
(0.87) 
9.83% 
Royal Bank of Scotland  9 364.99 
(1.36) 
-0.13 
(-0.20) 
0.58% 
Wells Fargo & Co 26 62.31 
(0.64) 
0.97 
(0.66) 
1.8% 
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 denotes the quarterly trading revenue at time t+1 for bank i; 𝐸[𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1] denotes the moving 
average of the previous four quarters trading revenues, for bank i; |𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝐸[𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1]| is the explained 
variable and denotes the unexpected absolute trading revenue for bank i at time t; 𝜎𝑖,𝑡 is the explanatory 
variable and denotes the volatility measure based on VaR at time t for bank i. 
  * denotes p-value ≤ 0.05 ** denotes p-value ≤ 0.01 *** denotes p-value ≤ 0.001. 
 
 
                                                 
16 Assesses the fit of the equation, comparing it to one with no explanatory variables that uses the mean of the 
explained variable as sole predictor. 
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Moving on to the full estimation of the equation, presented on table 8, a pooled 
sample OLS was regressed, presenting a VaR based volatility coefficient of 3.37, 
significant for a p-value below 0.001. The R2 is 36.96%, which evidences a good 
model fit.  
 
Table 8 - Pooled Regressions of Quarterly Absolute Unexpected Trading Revenues on VaR-Based Volatility 
|𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝐸[𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1]| = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝜎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 
 N. 
observations 
Constant Slope 
R2 (t-statistic) 
Pooled Sample OLS 221 -92.50 
(-1.21) 
3.37*** 
(11.32) 
36.96% 
Heteroskedasticity-
robust   
221 -92.50 
(-0.86) 
3.23*** 
(4.79) 
36.65% 
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 denotes the quarterly trading revenue at time t+1 for bank i; 𝐸[𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1] denotes the moving 
average of the previous four quarterly trading revenues, for bank i; |𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝐸[𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1]| is the explained 
variable and denotes the unexpected absolute trading revenue for bank i at time t; 𝜎𝑖,𝑡 is the explanatory 
variable and denotes the volatility measure based on VaR at time t for bank i. 
  * denotes p-value ≤ 0.05 ** denotes p-value ≤ 0.01 *** denotes p-value ≤ 0.001. 
 
Some evidences of heteroscedasticity are found in figure 3 with an increasing 
dispersion of unexpected trading revenues as volatility based on VaR increases. 
There is also evidence in figure 2, particularly on the 2008 trading revenues drop. 
Considering this, a heteroscedasticity-robust t statistic was also computed (see 
table 8), and similar results to the Pooled Sample OLS were obtained.  
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Figure 2 - Quarterly VaR-Based Volatility in Absolute Unexpected Trading Revenues 
 To control for potential endogeneity issues, considering the sample 
combines cross section with time series, an iteration of the model with fixed 
effects (FE) is performed. The FE technique adds a group of dummy variables to 
control for the existence of omitted variables that are assumed constant across 
group members but may vary across groups.  
 The above was performed for both banks and dates and the results are 
presented on table 9. 
Table 9 - Pooled Regressions of Quarterly Absolute Unexpected Trading Revenues on VaR-Based Volatility - 
Fixed Effects 
|𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝐸[𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1]| = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝜎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 
 N. 
observations 
Constant Slope 
R2 (t-statistic) 
FE applied to banks 221 -96.15 
(-1,21) 
3.37*** 
(9,32) 
47.85% 
FE applied to dates 221 -980 
(-1.65) 
2.17*** 
(5.58) 
73.83% 
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 denotes the quarterly trading revenue at time t+1 for bank i; 𝐸[𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1] denotes the moving 
average of the previous four quarterly trading revenues, for bank i; |𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝐸[𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1]| is the explained 
variable and denotes the unexpected absolute trading revenue for bank i at time t; 𝜎𝑖,𝑡 is the explanatory 
variable and denotes the volatility measure based on VaR at time t for bank i. 
  * denotes p-value ≤ 0.05 ** denotes p-value ≤ 0.01 *** denotes p-value ≤ 0.001. 
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It is possible to understand that in both cases the VaR based volatility is 
significant for a p-value of 0.001 and the R2 is 48% and 74%, for the FE applied to 
banks and dates respectively, showing a very satisfactory model fitting when 
controlling for endogeneity. The VaR based coefficient is similar to the obtained 
with the OLS model, of 3.37 and 2.17, when controlling for banks and dates, 
respectively. 
Moving to the annual database, the same procedures were performed and 
worse results are expected due to the already mentioned loss of accuracy when 
increasing the time frame between the reported VaR and the reported trading 
revenues. 
Primary, the formulated regression is estimated individually for each bank. 
Among yearly observations, sixteen time series regressions were tested. Table 10 
shows the obtained results under a univariate OLS. It was not tested under the 
SUR method because this equation must be balanced, meaning that any 
information that is only available for some equations will be lost. In this case, 
much information would be unexploited, so this test was excluded. 
It is possible to conclude that the results of Credit Suisse Group AG and 
UniCredit SPA seem to suggest a statistically significant relationship between the 
volatility measure derived from VaR and unexpected trading revenues. 
Furthermore, the coefficient determination (R2) for these two banks regressions 
is of 74% and 57%, indicating a good fit of the model. The remaining banks 
isolated, did not present significant coefficients for the VaR based volatility. 
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Table 10 - Bank Specific Regressions of Yearly Absolute Unexpected Trading Revenues on VaR-Based Volatility 
|𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝐸[𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1]| = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝜎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 
Bank 
N. 
observations 
OLS 
Constant Slope 
R2 (t-statistic) 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya 
Argentaria 
8 749.49 
(1.48) 
-2.44 
(-0.81) 
9.85% 
Banco Santander SA 
12 3277.81 
(1.86) 
-10.34 
(-0.97) 
8.54% 
Barclays PLC 
17 -84.31 
(0.940) 
6.35 
(1.91) 
19.64% 
BNP Paribas 
9 659.11 
(2.25) 
0.23 
(0.50) 
3.50% 
Credit Agricole 
9 3427.33 
(3.27) 
-1.85 
(-0.34) 
1.59% 
Credit Suisse Group AG 
12 -5378.63 
(-3.16) 
22.70*** 
(5.37) 
74.27% 
HSBC Holdings PLC 
12 2092.71 
(3.08) 
1.49 
(1.06) 
10.09% 
Intesa Sanpaolo 
12 911.64 
(2.93) 
-1.19 
(-1.61) 
20.58% 
JPMorgan Chase & Co 
17 -432.98 
(-0,15) 
5.94 
(1.64) 
15.24% 
Lloyds Banking Group PLC 
12 14420.94 
(4.11) 
-24.19 
(-0.69) 
4.58% 
Nordea Bank ABP 
12 319.02 
(1.96) 
-0.11 
(-0.36) 
1.31% 
Royal Bank of Canada 
4 59.57 
(0.33) 
0.41 
(0.48) 
10.48% 
Royal Bank of Scotland 
Group 
14 2448.18 
(1.25) 
0.69 
(0.22) 
0.39% 
Societe Generale 
13 1536.92 
(0.84) 
4.42 
(0.69) 
4.15% 
Unicredit SPA 
12 62.35 
(0.18) 
3.37** 
(3.67) 
57.35% 
Wells Fargo & Co 
9 154.43 
(1.10) 
1.30 
(1.73) 
29.93% 
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 denotes the quarterly trading revenue at time t+1 for bank i; 𝐸[𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1] denotes the moving 
average of the previous four quarterly trading revenues, for bank i; |𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝐸[𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1]| is the explained 
variable and denotes the unexpected absolute trading revenue for bank i at time t; 𝜎𝑖,𝑡 is the explanatory 
variable and denotes the volatility measure based on VaR at time t for bank i. 
  * denotes p-value ≤ 0.05 ** denotes p-value ≤ 0.01 *** denotes p-value ≤ 0.001. 
 
Moving on to the full estimation of the equation, a pooled sample OLS was 
regressed, presenting a non-significant VaR based coefficient. 
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Table 11 - Pooled Regressions of Yearly Absolute Unexpected Trading Revenues on VaR-Based Volatility 
 
|𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝐸[𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1]| = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝜎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 
 N. 
observations 
Constant Slope 
R2 (t-statistic) 
Pooled Sample OLS 184 2533.67 
(4.91) 
0.17 
(0.15) 
0.01% 
Heteroskedasticity-robust   184 2533.67 
(3.83) 
0.17 
(0.11) 
0.01% 
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 denotes the quarterly trading revenue at time t+1 for bank i; 𝐸[𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1] denotes the moving 
average of the previous four quarterly trading revenues, for bank i; |𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝐸[𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1]| is the explained 
variable and denotes the unexpected absolute trading revenue for bank i at time t; 𝜎𝑖,𝑡 is the explanatory 
variable and denotes the volatility measure based on VaR at time t for bank i. 
  * denotes p-value ≤ 0.05 ** denotes p-value ≤ 0.01 *** denotes p-value ≤ 0.001. 
 
Some extra evidences of heteroscedasticity are found in figure 4, compared 
with the quarterly basis, with an increasing dispersion of unexpected trading 
revenues as volatility based on VaR increases. There is also evidence in figure 2, 
particularly on the 2008 trading revenues drop.  
Considering this, a heteroscedasticity-robust t statistic was also computed, 
and similar results to the Pooled Sample OLS were obtained. 
 
 
Figure 3 - Yearly VaR-Based Volatility in Absolute Unexpected Trading Revenues 
  45 
 To control for potential endogeneity issues, considering the sample 
combines cross section with time series, an iteration of the model with fixed 
effects (FE) is performed (see table 12).  
 The above was performed for both banks and dates (time-series and cross 
sectionally) and the results are presented below. 
 
Table 12 - Pooled Regressions of Yearly Absolute Unexpected Trading Revenues on VaR-Based Volatility - 
Fixed Effects 
|𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝐸[𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1]| = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝜎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 
 N. 
observations 
Constant Slope 
R2 
(t-statistic) 
FE applied to banks 184 -87.72 
(-0.07) 
2.61* 
(2.34) 
44.36% 
FE applied to dates 184 2529 
(-1.65) 
-1.25 
(-1.05) 
23.36% 
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 denotes the quarterly trading revenue at time t+1 for bank i; 𝐸[𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1] denotes the moving 
average of the previous four quarterly trading revenues, for bank i; |𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝐸[𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1]| is the explained 
variable and denotes the unexpected absolute trading revenue for bank i at time t; 𝜎𝑖,𝑡 is the explanatory 
variable and denotes the volatility measure based on VaR at time t for bank i. 
* denotes p-value ≤ 0.05 ** denotes p-value ≤ 0.01 *** denotes p-value ≤ 0.001. 
 
It is possible to understand that the VaR based volatility coefficient is 
significant for a p-value of 0.05 in the FE applied to banks, with an R2 of 44%, 
showing a satisfactory model fitting when controlling for endogeneity. However, 
the VaR based volatility when using FE applied to dates does not appear as 
significant. 
The overall performance of the same models, when applied to yearly data 
demonstrates much poorer performance then when applied to quarterly data, 
showing that the closer the VaR reporting is to the following trading revenues 
report, the better the explanatory power of the first over the second. 
Summarizing, it is possible to infer that the VaR based volatility improved its 
performance over the years, considering the results obtained in this study. When 
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compared to Jorion (2002) paper, the current results produce better R2, meaning 
a relative increase in the model’s fit, and larger coefficients at a lower p-value 
level, which increases certainty on the significance of VaR when explaining 
unexpected trading revenues. 
  
  47 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
VaR is an evident keystone indicator in the market risk management sphere, 
generally accepted by stakeholders as a reliable measure of an institution’s 
maximum potential losses related to market risk. Therefore, the core aim of this 
study is to understand how informative the VaR publicly disclosed by financial 
institutions under their mandatory reporting is.  
Until now, the only precedent for this study was developed by Jorion (2002), 
who at the time concluded that the informativeness of VaR disclosures in firms’ 
financial reports was of considerable interest. He added that, over time, as the 
methodologies become more consistent and the reports available more abundant, 
one would expect the VaR-based volatility to become increasingly accurate indicator of 
the variability of banks’ future trading revenues. 
The current study, by updating and enlarging the sample for the period of 
2000-2018 and 16 large banks, was able to successfully confirm the increase in 
VaR informativeness. This is supported on consecutive methodological 
evolutions over the past years combined with the emergence of backtesting 
techniques, which were gradually embedded in the banking industry. 
The VaR publicly disclosed by financial institutions in their quarterly reports 
demonstrated very satisfactory informativeness on the subsequently reported 
trading revenues. As expected from the beginning of this study, when running 
and testing the same regression using a sample of annual reported data, the 
results were not as satisfactory. 
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From the results obtained, VaR reinforces its position as a valuable instrument 
for stakeholders when evaluating the market risk profile of financial institutions. 
An evident limitation of this study was the unbalanced data both in time series 
and cross-sectionally, which creates boundaries to the scope of tests being 
applied. Simultaneously, correcting this unbalancing would imply losing too 
much information. It would be of great interest to perform similar work having 
a considerably large sample of balanced data available. 
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